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I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
United States Customs law' requires every import to be marked with its
country of origin2 in such a manner that purchasers can easily find the
mark and "read it without strain."' Because consumers presumably use this
knowledge to "buy American," domestic manufacturers encourage the
enforcing agency, the United States Customs Service ("Customs"), 5 to
interpret6 the marking statute strictly.7 Until recently, a domestic manufac-
turer accomplished this by requesting Customs to issue an interpretive
"letter ruling"' requiring a particular good to carry a more "conspicuous"
1. 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 134 (1994) (implementing § 304). For a detailed
analysis of the statutory requirements, see infra part II.A.1.
2. For further discussion of the determination of the country of origin, see infra note 67 and
accompanying text.
3. 19 C.F.R. § 134.41(b) (1994) ("The ultimate purchaser in the United States must be able to
find the marking easily and read it without strain.").
4. Robert F. Ruyak, Note, United States Country of Origin Marking Requirements: The
Application of a Nontariff Trade Barrier, 6 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 485, 487 (1974) ("Presumably,
if U.S. consumers were given a clear choice-which would be supplied by the marking require-
ments-they would be persuaded by a sense of national pride and a confidence in 'U.S. quality' to
purchase domestic items over their foreign counterparts."). However, this commentator notes that no
empirical studies have proved or disproved this theory. Id. at 487. For further discussion of the use of
"buy American" sentiment in legislation, see infra note 33 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the history and responsibilities of the Customs Service, see infra part
II.A.2.
6. Congress granted Customs the power to interpret the provisions of§ 304 as needed. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1304(a) (1988). For instance, Customs may "[d]etermine the character of words and phrases or
abbreviations thereof and prescribe any reasonable method of marking.., and a conspicuous place on
the article (or container) where the marking shall appear." 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1) (1988).
7. See, e.g., Letter from Paul C. Rosenthal, Esq., of Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott on behalf of
the American Brass & Iron Foundry, Charlotte Pipe and Foundry Co., and Tyler Pipe Industries, to
Carol Hallett, Commissioner of Customs, U.S. Customs Service (July 27, 1992) [hereinafter Letter to
Hallett] (on file with author). Pursuant to § 177, the letter requests that Customs rule on "whether the
markings on imported pipe are 'conspicious' and 'legible' within the meaning of [§ 304]." Id. at 1. A
related letter sent earlier from Rosenthal to Customs states in pertinent part:
Plumbing contractors and general contractors might or might not choose to use domestically-
produced cast iron soil pipe if informed of the country of origin by conspicuous marking, but
U.S. Customs laws mandate that they should be given a choice. Presently, however, they are
not being given the opportunity to make such a choice because Venezuelan pipe is not being
marked conspicuously or legibly.
Letter from Paul C. Rosenthal, Esq., of Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott on behalf of the American Brass
& Iron Foundry Co., and Tyler Pipe Industries, to Thomas Lobred, Chief, Value and Marking, U.S.
Customs Service, 4 (Jan. 21, 1992) [hereinafter Letter to Lobred] (on file with author).
8. Section 177 of the Customs regulations provides for "letter rulings" which "interpret[] and
appl[y] the provisions of the Customs and related laws to a specific set of facts." 19 C.F.R. § 177.1(d)
(1994). For a detailed discussion of these rulings, see infra part II.B.I.
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or "legible" 9 country of origin mark."° In Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v.
United States," however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit banned the use of this procedure for marking issues."
Instead, the court required domestic interested parties to file section 516
petitions with the Secretary of the Treasury. 3 If successful, these petitions
result in the assessment of an additional duty on mismarked imports.'
4
However, section 516 petitions are a poor vehicle for bringing country
of origin marking issues before customs. First, section 516 petitions
misrepresent the concerns of domestic manufacturers by seeking additional
duties in lieu of alternative statutory interpretation. Second, section 516
petitions 5 impose redundant procedural burdens on petitioning parties, 6
while failing to provide measurable due process benefits to importers.'
Therefore, Congress should act to create more effective ruling and appeal
provisions.
This Note analyzes the ability of domestic manufacturers to influence
Customs' interpretation and application of the country of origin marking
statute, both before and after the Norcal/Crosetti decision. Part II is divided
into three sub-parts. Sub-part A presents section 304,"8 the substantive
marking law, and offers a brief overview of Customs' history and
responsibilities. Sub-part B presents the two procedural provisions:
9. For a discussion of these terms, see infra note 29.
10. See, e.g., Letter to Hallett, supra note 7, at I n.1; Letter to Lobred, supra note 7.
11. 963 F.2d 356 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
12. Id. at 360.
13. Id. See also 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 175 (1994) (implementing § 1516). For a
detailed discussion of this procedure, see infra part II.B.2.
14. Section 304 provides for, inter alia, an additional duty of 10% ad valorem when goods are
not properly marked with the country of origin. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(f) (1988). For further discussion of
penalties on mismarked goods, see infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
15. The Norcal/Crosetti court failed to recognize the distinction between the letter rulings process
and the § 516 administrative procedure mandated by its holding. There is a significant distinction
between writing a letter asking Customs to construe the marking statute in a certain manner, and filing
a petition demanding that Customs charge an importer additional duties because his goods do not
conform with the existing interpretation of the statute. See infra part III.A.2. Should Congress fail to
enact a legislative remedy, the § 516 procedure will be strained beyond its intended scope as domestic
industry attempts to adapt the procedure to address its true concerns.
16. Section 516 petitions result in redundant notice-and-comment requirements that increase
petitioning parties' transaction costs and restrict their access to the courts. For further discussion of
these problems, see infra part III.B. I.
17. For further discussion of how § 516's notice-and-comment opportunities fail to provide
importers with additional meaningful due process, see infra part III.B.2.
18. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1988).
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section 177,' 9 the provision governing the letter rulings employed by
domestic manufacturers prior to Norcal/Crosetti, and section 516,20 the
provision governing the domestic interested party petitions required by
Norcal/Crosetti. Sub-part C presents the Norcal/Crosetti case.2' Part III
focuses on the problems caused by "shoe-homing"22 marking issues into
the section 516 administrative procedure. Finally, Part IV suggests a
legislative remedy for the unique problem of country of origin marking
issues. Specifically, this Note proposes adapting certain North American
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") dispute resolution procedures to apply
on a multinational basis.23 This would provide predictable and transparent
procedures for all parties involved, in compliance with the United States'
obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"). 24
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Substantive Law: Getting Imports In
1. Section 304: The Marking Statute
Section 304 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,25 requires every foreign26
19. 19 C.F.R. § 177 (1994).
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1988).
21. Norcal/Crosetti Foods v. United States Customs Service, 758 F. Supp. 729 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1991), rev'd, 963 F.2d 356 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
22. Justice Musgrave first used this term in Norcal/Crosetti, 758 F. Supp. at 733. He noted the
"[in]appropriateness of shoe-homing" marking issues into the § 516 administrative procedure. Id.
23. See North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States, Dec. 17, 1992,
art. 1805 (G.P.O. 1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
24. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 2.2, 2.9.1, 2.9.4 (U.S.T.R.
ed., 1994). Article 2.2 of this agreement, which echoes GATT Article III obligations, requires that
"Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to
or with the effect of creating obstacles for international trade." Id. at 2.2. Article 2.9 further requires
publication and opportunity to comment. Id. at 2.9.1, 2.9.4. One might argue that the marking statute
violates Article 2.2 entirely. This Note, however, takes a more functional approach, operating under the
premise that § 304, the marking statute, does exist, and therefore, domestic manufacturers have a right
to use it as Congress intended.
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1988). This statute provides:
(a) Marking of articles
Except as hereinafter provided, every article of foreign origin (or its container, as provided
in subsection (b) hereof) imported into the United States shall be marked in a conspicuous
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss4/6
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import27 destined for American consumers28 to be marked conspicuously,
legibly, and permanently 29 with its country of origin.30  Congress, a
historically protectionist institution," passed the marking provision32 to
place as legibly, indelibly, and permanently as the nature of the article (or container) will
permit in such a manner as to indicate to an ultimate purchaser in the United States the
English name of the country of origin of the article.
Id.; see also 19 C.F.R. § 134.11 (1994). Section 134 contains the Customs regulations interpreting and
implementing § 304.
26. Section 304 only applies to foreign origin goods. 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988). United States
components sent abroad for further processing may qualify for special marking under the Customs
regulations, in which case the label can read "Assembled in __ from U.S. materials." 19 C.F.R. § 10.22
(1994). However, the country of assembly is the country of origin for marking purposes only. Letter
from John Durant, Director, Commercial Rulings Division, U.S. Customs Service, to Katten, Muchin
& Zavis (Mar. 25, 1991), available in LEXIS, ITRADE Library, ALLCUS File. For duty assessment,
the normal rules of origin apply. See infra note 67.
27. Section 304, the country of origin marking statute, imposes substantive marking requirements
on each "article" in a shipment of goods. 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 134.1 (1994)
(definitions). However, the term "article" is not defined in the statute. If the nature of an article prevents
it from being marked, the article's container must still be marked. 19 C.F.R. § 134.22(a) (1994). Some
inherently unmarkable goods are specifically exempted from marking by subsection (J) of § 304. 19
U.S.C. § 1304(a)(3)(J). Examples of these "J-list" items include works of art, chemicals and drugs,
paper, furs and feathers, wire, livestock, sugar, and Christmas trees. 19 C.F.R. § 134.33 (1994). J-list
exceptions are granted on the basis of policy. Ruyak, supra note 4, at 507.
2S. The marking statute aims to inform the "ultimate purchaser" of the country of origin of the
good. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1988). "Ultimate purchaser" is defined as "the last person in the United
States who will receive the article in the form in which it was imported." 19 C.F.R. § 134.1(d) (1994).
The question of who constitutes an ultimate purchaser has been the subject ofjudicial review. See, e.g.,
Pabrini, Inc. v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 360 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986); Uniroyal, Inc. v. United States,
542 F. Supp. 1026 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), affid, 702 F.2d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Gibson-Thomsen Co.
v. United States, 2 Cust. Ct. 172 (1939), aft'd, 27 C.C.P.A. 267 (1940).
29. These terms evade concrete definition due to the infinite fact-specific variables of each case,
resulting in generalized rules and item-by-item determinations. See Ruyak, supra note 4, at 490.
Generally, the mark must be easily identifiable from a casual inspection, with printing that is
comparatively large, contrastingly colored, and not smudged or otherwise obscured. Id. at 490-91. The
permanence requirement has been interpreted to mean that the mark need only stay on long enough to
reach the ultimate purchaser, who may then remove the mark. Id. at 491-92.
30. "Country of origin" is defined as "the country of manufacture, production, or growth of any
article .. " 19 C.F.R. § 134.1(b) (1994). The definition also provides that "[flurther work or material
added to an article in another country must effect a substantial transformation in order to render such
other country the 'country of origin."' Id. (emphasis added). See generally United States v. Murray, 621
F.2d 1163 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980) (defining country of origin and substantial
transformation). For further discussion of rules of origin and substantial transformation, see infra note
67.
31. In 1928, the United States Supreme Court upheld a blatantly protectionist tariff act and
acknowledged Congress' propensity to protectionism, stating:
[No historian, whatever his view of the wisdom of the policy of protection, would contend
that Congress since the first Revenue Act, in 1789, has not assumed that it was within its
power ... to encourage the growth of the industries of the nation by protecting home
production against foreign competition.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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improve the competitive position 3 of domestic industry by capitalizing on
consumer tendencies to "buy American. 34 If a good does not bear the
proper mark at the time of importation and the importer fails to rectify the
situation, Customs imposes an "additional" duty35 of ten percent ad
valorem, i.e., ten percent of the value of the goods.36 However, payment
of this duty does not relieve the importer from the duty to mark,37 and
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 411 (1928).
32. Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 6, 26 Stat. 613 (1890).
33. See Diamond Match Co. v. United States, 49 C.C.P.A. 52, 61 (1962) (Martin, J., dissenting)
("[M]any consumers prefer to 'buy American' or will not purchase merchandise originating in a
particular country for one reason or another. ... Because of this attitude... the domestic
manufacturer's competitive position is improved and he has the right to protect this position.").
34. 1 BRUCE E. CLUBB, UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE LAw § 19.13, at 396 (1991) ("The
purpose of the marking requirement was to inform the United States consumer of the country of origin
of imported articles because Congress believed that the knowledge could influence the consumer's
choice of products.") (citing H.R. REP. No. 1466, 51st Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7 (1890) (stating that the
purpose of the marking statute is "to protect both our own people from imposition of inferior goods and
the revenue from possible loss through undervaluation.")). See also United States v. Friedlaender & Co.,
27 C.C.P.A. 297, 302 (1940) ("The evident purpose of [the statute] is to mark goods so that at the time
of purchase the ultimate purchaser may, by knowing where the goods are produced, be able to buy or
refuse to buy them, if such marking will influence his will."); Globemaster, Inc. v. United States, 340
F. Supp. 974, 976 (Cust. Ct. 1972) ("Congress was also aware of the fact that many consumers prefer
merchandise produced in this country, and sought... to confer an advantage on domestic producers.").
35. The statute specifically deems the 10% duty merely "additional" and states that it "shall not
be construed to be penal." 19 U.S.C. § 1304(f) (1988). However, given the construction of the statute,
the duty serves no other purpose than to coerce importers to properly mark the goods; therefore, the
duty is actually a penalty for noncompliance. See infra note 37. Of note, Customs officials themselves
refer to the duty as a penalty. See Letter from John Durant, Director, Commercial Rulings Division,
United States Customs Service, to Newark International Airport 1 (Feb. 12, 1991), available in LEXIS,
ITRADE Library, ALLCUS File (referring to "a penalty case involving failure to mark the country of
origin of tin-lead ingots") (emphasis added).
36. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(f) (1988). The provision also requires the violating importer to pay the costs
of the supervising Customs officials. Id.; see also 19 C.F.R. § 134.55 (1994) (detailing billable costs).
For a discussion of the term "ad valorem," see infra note 75 and accompanying text.
37. In Globemaster, Inc. v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 974, 978 (Cust. Ct. 1972) (quoting United
States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc., 440 F.2d 1024, 1029 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), the court invoked
§ 304(g) and held that "an importer who pays the duty [for not marking] cannot thereby obtain the right
to import without marking." Subsection (g) of § 304 provides:
(g) Delivery withheld until marked
No imported article held in Customs custody for inspection, examination, or appraisement
shall be delivered until such article and every other article of the importation ... shall have
been marked in accordance with the requirements of this section or until the amount of duty
estimated to be payable under subsection (f) [the 10% duty plus costs] has been deposited.
Nothing in this section shall be construed as excepting any article... from the particular
requirements of marking ....
19 U.S.C. § 1304(g) (1988) (emphasis added).
Originally, the penalty for mismarking was complete denial of entry. Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244,
§ 6, 26 Stat. 613 (1890). An 1894 amendment provided that mismarked goods were not to be delivered
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failure to mark can result in forced exportation or destruction of the
goods,38 liquidated damages,39 and even criminal sanctions.4" Thus, the
marking statute creates a two-part trade barrier: First, the statutory marking
requirements act as an "entry barrier." Second, the mark itself serves as a
"sales barrier" in the marketplace.
to the importer until they were properly marked, thereby granting Customs supervisory powers. Tariff
Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 5, 28 Stat. 547 (1894). The ad valorem "penalty" duty was added in the Tariff
Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 304(a), 42 Stat. 936 (1922). One commentator argues that the language of
§ 304(g) indicates that the 10% duty was merely to "insure that there would be no delivery of imported
articles [to the importer) until they were properly marked." David Silverstein, Country of Origin
Marking Requirements under Section 304 of the Tariff Act: An Importer's Map Through the Maze, 25
Am. Bus. L.J. 285, 287 (1987). On the other hand, in his treatise on trade law, Clubb states that
"[w]here the goods have already been sold by the importer to the general public, an additional duty of
10 percent of the value of the goods may be assessed for the marking violation." CLUBB, supra note
34, § 19.16, at 409 (emphasis added). This implies that the additional duty is a disfavored substitute
for actual marking and is imposed only when goods that have been released on bond cannot be
retrieved. Globemaster supports this analysis. 340 F. Supp. at 977 (discussing importing practice and
the release of goods under bond). For a discussion of bond, see infra note 58.
38. 19 C.F.R. § 134.51(a) (1994). The Customs regulations provide:
§ 134.51 Procedure when importation found not legally marked.
(a) Notice to mark or redeliver. When articles or containers are found upon examination not
to be legally marked, the district director shall notify the importer ... to arrange ... to
properly mark the article or containers, or to return all released articles to Customs custody
for marking, exportation, or destruction.
Id. (emphasis added). On the issue of redelivery, Customs "may demand that the goods be recalled to
Customs' custody and properly marked by the importer before they are released again from Customs'
custody." CLUBB, supra note 34, § 19.16, at 409.
39. 19 C.F.R. § 134.54(a) (1994). This section provides:
§ 134.54 Articles released from Customs custody.
(a) Demand for liquidated damages. If within 30 days ... the importer does not properly
mark or redeliver all merchandise previously released to him, the district director shall
demand payment of liquidated damages incurred under the bond in an amount equal to the
entered value of the articles not properly marked or redelivered, plus any estimated duty
thereon as determined at the time of entry.
Id.
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(h) (1988). Criminal sanctions were first added for intentional marking
violations in 1909. Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 8, 36 Stat. 86 (1909). Today, criminal fines up to
$250,000 and/or imprisonment terms not exceeding one year can be imposed if the violation is
committed with the intent to defraud Customs. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(h) (1988).
41. Ruyak, supra note 4, at 485-87. Thus, the marking provision is a blatantly protectionist
measure. However, it is beyond the scope of this Note to pursue in depth the free trade/protectionism
debate inherent in the battle between importers and domestic manufacturers. Briefly, free trade adherents
posit that "all consumers in all countries will be better off if there are no restrictions on imports, since
there will be a wider variety of goods available in greater quantity and at a lower price." CLUBB, supra
note 34, at Ixii. Conversely, protectionists point out that "people are not only consumers but are also
workers and factory owners and, if they have no jobs, they lack the income to buy goods either foreign
or domestic no matter how plentiful and inexpensive the goods may be." Id. Therefore, protectionists
wholeheartedly support governmental intervention on behalf of domestic industry to restrict imports,
typified in measures like § 304. See id. at lxii-lxiii. Free-traders, on the other hand, would like to see
Washington University Open Scholarship
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2. The History and Purpose of the Customs Service
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations 42 and to levy
duties43 on imported goods." Pursuant to this authority, Congress passed
a provision imposing duties on all imports almost immediately after the
Constitution came into force.4' The duty provision had two goals: to
create revenue for the federal government and to protect America's infant
industries.46 To enforce the duty provision, Congress created the United
States Customs Service.47
As international commerce has increased in both volume and complexity,
so have Customs' responsibilities.4 ' These responsibilities can be classified
§ 304 stricken from the books. As it stands, § 304 exists and until Congress decides otherwise, domestic
manufacturers have the right to use it for the purposes Congress envisioned. For a detailed analysis of
the negative aspects of protectionist United States trade laws, see Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The
International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 394 (1994).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
43. This Note uses the words "duty" and "tariff' interchangeably to mean the tax on imports
mandated by Congress and enforced by Customs. See BLACK's LAw DICTiONARY 1014-15 (6th ed.
1991); see also Walter E. Doherty, An Introduction to Customs Law and Practice, I1 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J 301, 302-04 (1987) (explaining the history of duties and tariffs).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises ... but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.!).
45. Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24 (1789). That this Act was Congress' second indicates the
importance with which Congress viewed tariffs. See CLUBE, supra note 34, § 1.7, at 14, § 12.2, at 254;
Daniel K. Tarullo, Law and Politics in Twentieth Century Tariff History, 34 UCLA L. RtV. 285, 286
(1986).
46. The Act stated that the imposition of tariffs was "necessary for the support of the govern-
ment ... and the encouragement of protection of manufacturers." Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24
(1789). See also CLUBB, supra note 34, § 1.7, at 14; Tarullo, supra note 45, at 286. One commentator
argues that the protectionist goals of the first tariff act were second to the goal of creating much-needed
revenue. Doherty, supra note 43, at 305. Whether or not this commentator is correct, the differences
of opinion between those advocating tariffs for revenue only and those seeking to use the tariffs to
protect industry have been manifested over the years in alternating high and low tariffs. Ruth F. Sturm,
Customs: Past, Present, and Future, 37 FED. B. NEws & J. 151 (1990). These differences of opinion
are currently reflected in the views of the two political parties. Id.
47. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29-49 (1789).
48. Other responsibilities include monitoring export controls, preventing smuggling, collecting
trade statistics, administering the bonded warehouse system, and regulating coastal shipping. CLUEB,
supra note 34, § 12.5, at 257-61, § 12.2, at 270.
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as either three categories: fiscal, regulatory, or statistical in nature.49 Fiscal
activities can be described as those necessary for and having the ultimate
goal of collecting or disbursing money. By contrast, regulatory activities
determine "whether [goods] shall be allowed to enter the country," are
"explicitly forbidden" or are allowed "only if they are of certain prescribed
standards."'"
a) Fiscal Responsibilities: Assessing Duties
To achieve uniform and consistent collection of duties, foreign goods
arriving in a United States port are immediately received into the custody
of the Customs Service. 2 This requires the importer to satisfy Customs,
rather than placing the burden on Customs to chase down every import-
er.53 To "clear Customs," 54 an importer must present certain documenta-
tion" associated with a shipment of goods to the Customs officials at the
port of entry. 6 At that time, Customs officials examine the goods and
49. LAWRENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE CUSTOMS SERVICE: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND
ORGANIZATION 32, 126 (AMS Press 1974) (1924). Customs' statistical activities are currently limited
to the collection of raw data. Id. at 29. In 1923, responsibility for the compilation and publication of
Customs data was transferred to the Department of Commerce. Id. at 29-30 (citing Act of Jan. 5, 1923,
ch. 23, 42 Stat. 1109 (1923)).
50. Id. at 33. This Note is concerned only with Customs' collection responsibilities. The Customs'
disbursement function involves the refund of duties on United States components further processed
abroad and returned to the United States under section 9802.00.80 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule
of the United States. See id. at 32; U.S. INT'L TRADE COMNI'N, PUB. No. 2567, HARMONIZED TARIFF
SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES, (1993) [hereinafter HTSUS]; supra note 25 (discussing special
marking requirements for goods further processed abroad). For an explanation of the HTSUS, see infra
notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
51. SCHNMECKEBIER, supra note 49, at 72-73.
52. 19 C.F.R. § 141 (1994).
53. In 1815, Congress passed a law against smuggling that permitted any naval officer or Customs
inspector to stop and search suspect vehicles for goods which had not paid the import tax. Act of March
3, 1815, ch. 94, § 2, 3 Stat. 231, 232 (1815). The Act allowed the inspectors to "seize the goods in
anticipation of trial" if probable cause existed for the belief that the importer had evaded duty payment.
CLUBB, supra note 34, § 12.5.2, at 259.
54. This non-legal term encompasses the entire process that is required to satisfy Customs'
regulations.
55. Such documentation includes: an entry form conforming with 19 C.F.R. § 141.61 (1994),
naming the importer as the importer of record, describing the merchandise, and showing the amount
of duties due; a copy of the commercial invoice showing what is contained in the shipment and the
amount that the importer paid for it, per 19 U.S.C. § 1484(b) (1988); a bill of lading, per 19 U.S.C.
§ 1484(c) (1988); a check for the amount of the estimated duties due, per 19 C.F.R. §§ 141.101-105
(1994); and, if necessary, a power of attorney authorizing the broker to act on behalf of the importer,
per 19 C.F.R. § 141.31(a) (1994). See also CLUBB, supra note 34, § 19.4, at 382.
56. CLUBB, supra note 34, at 380.
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perform their statutorily mandated functions which include, inter alia, the
assessment of duties.57 If the importer does not have the necessary
documentation or does not pay the duties, Customs will not release the
goods. 8
Assessment of duties involves a two-step process of "classification" and
"valuation." 9 In classification, a Customs official fits an importer's goods
into one of approximately 8,000 descriptive "tariff schedule" categories
according to the nature of the goods.6" The tariff schedule, known as the
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States ("HTSUS"),6' lists the
categories in an outline format, with each tabulation describing goods with
increasing specificity. Each category, or "tariff heading," has been assigned
a percentage duty rate by Congress.62 Because duties differ from heading
to heading, the tariff heading under which a Customs official classifies an
import is of utmost importance to the importer.63
The duty rate assigned to each tariff heading is further broken down on
a country-specific basis. The HTSUS has two columns of duty rates, and
the application of one column over the other turns on the country of origin
of the import.' The first column contains a concessionary rate for goods
57. For a descriptive list of additional Customs responsibilities, see supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
58. See CLUBB, supra note 34, § 19.4, at 382 ("Customs will not release the goods to the broker
without [the bill of lading].'); § 19.14.2, at 407 ("In order to obtain release of the goods from Customs'
custody, the importer must put up a bond, under which a surety undertakes to 'pay any and all such
duties and taxes found to be due.") (citing 19 C.F.R. § 143.3(a)-(b) (1989)).
59. CLUBB, supra note 34, at 383; Charles Routh, A Few Pointers on Customs Law, 40 PRAC.
LAW. 43, 44 (1994).
60. One commentator notes, "classification of commodities ... gives the greatest trouble in
customs administration. [This is] due to the fact that there is often doubt regarding which one of several
classifications in the [HTSUS] is applicable to the particular article." SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 49,
at 42. See generally Routh, supra note 59, at 44-46; Peggy Chaplin, An Introduction to the Harmonized
System, 12 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 417 (1987).
61. HTSUS, supra note 50.
62. See id.
63. In one recent example, Customs' New York office issued a letter ruling classifying a mylar
glove liner under HTSUS 6116.93.1000, "gloves, mittens and mitts, knitted or crocheted: other: of
synthetic fibers: ski or snowmobile gloves, mittens and mitts," dutiable at a rate of 5.5 percent ad
valorem. Letter from John Durant, Director, Commercial Rulings Division, U.S. Customs Service, to
Lee, Smith, Wells and Lamont (Oct. 24, 1994), available in LEXIS, ITRADE Library, ALLCUS File,
Based on Stonewall Trading Co. v. United States, 64 Cust. Ct. 482 (1970), which outlined the necessary
characteristics of "ski gloves," the Washington office believed that classification was an error. Id.
Customs re-issued a letter ruling classifying the gloves under HTSUS 6116.93.9400, "gloves, mittens
and mitts, knitted or crocheted: other of synthetic fibers: other: other: with fourchettes," dutiable at 19.8
percent ad valorem. Id. This change represented a 14.3 percent increase in price for the importer. Id.
64. CLUBB, supra note 34, § 19.7, at 387-89.
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from nations benefitting from special trade agreements.65 The second
column represents a higher "statutory rate" for products from nations not
parties to special trade agreements, mostly former Soviet nations.66 Thus,
an article's country of origin67 is significant for classification purposes
because the HTSUS applies a higher or lower duty rate depending on the
country of origin.6"
65. Id. This column is further broken down into a General and a Special subcolumn. Id. The
General subcolumn applies to countries benefitting from Most Favored Nation ("MFN") status (mainly
signatories of GATT). Id. The Special subcolumn is reserved for more specific United States trade
initiatives such as the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"), the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act ("CBERA"), and the United States-Israel Free Trade Area. Id.
66. Id. As these countries convert to market economies, it seems likely that the use of the statutory
rate will decline into near obscurity.
67. The manner in which Customs determines origin, referred to as the "rules of origin," is beyond
the scope of this Note. Generally, the rules of origin provide that an import is a product of either the
country in which a majority of the work has taken place, or the last country in which the item
underwent a "substantial transformation." 19 C.F.R. § 134.1(b) (1994). The rules of origin, and
especially the substantial transformation test, have been attacked by commentators as ambiguous and
unpredictable when applied. See Michael P. Maxwell, Formulating Rules of Origin for Imported
Merchandise: Transforming the Substantial Transformation Test, 23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
669, 671 (1990); John P. Simpson, Rules of Origin in Transition: A Changing Environment and
Prospectsfor Reform, 22 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 665, 667 (1991); C. Edward Galfand, Comment,
Heeding the Callfor a Predictable Rule of Origin, II U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 469, 470 (1989). These
commentators prefer a "tariff shift test," which imputes substantial transformation if the tariff
classification of an imported good has changed upon export due to farther processing. See Gary
Sampliner and Brian J. O'Shea, Rules of Origin for Foreign Acquisitions Under the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979, NAFTA, and the New GATTAccords, 23 PUB. CONT. L.J. 207, 232-33 (1994) (explaining
the tariff shift approach). For a discussion of NAFTA's new rules of origin, see infra note 68; see also
United States v. Gibson-Thomsen Co., Inc., 27 C.C.P.A. 267 (1940) (addressing the substantial
transformation test under the marking regulations); Kom North America v. United States, 701 F. Supp.
229 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (discussing the substantial transformation test with respect to marking
requirements); Uniroyal, Inc. v. United States, 542 F. Supp. 1026 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), affd, 702 F.2d
1022 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see generally Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v. United States, 207 U.S.
556 (1908); Superior Wire v. United States, 669 F. Supp. 472 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987), affd, 867 F.2d
1409 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Ferrostaal Metals Corp. v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 535 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1987).
68. In addition to determining the HTSUS duty rate, country of origin determines whether various
substantive trade restrictions apply. Some of the restrictions constitute fiscal activities and others,
regulatory. For example, enforcement of antidumping and countervailing duty orders, which impose
extra duties, qualifies as fiscal activity. SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 49, at 40-42. Enforcement of other
restrictions, such as embargoes, quotas, and health-related prohibitions, which completely bar the entry
of goods, constitutes a regulatory responsibility. Id. at 72-78.
Note that substantive country of origin rules are important in the context of§ 304 country of origin
marking only in that such rules determine which country must be marked on an item. They do not
prescribe the manner in which the item must be marked. These are two distinct issues. See Rules for
Determining the Country of Origin of a Good for Purposes of Annex 311 of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 59 Fed. Reg. 110 (1994) (changing the rules for determining country of origin from
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In the second step, valuation, Customs appraises how much a shipment
of goods is worth.69 Value is based on the market worth of the goods.70
While Customs prefers to use the actual transaction value of a particular
shipment of goods,7' sometimes such information is not yet available or is
not accurate. When this occurs, Customs establishes value using one of four
other value methodologies: identical goods value, similar goods value,
deductive value, or computed value.72 Customs applies these in descend-
ing order, employing the first usable definition on the list.7" In other
words, only if Customs is unable to use actual transaction value will it turn
to identical goods value, and then only if Customs cannot use identical
goods value will it turn to similar goods value, and so on.74
The value is multiplied by the percentage duty rate, resulting in an "ad
valorem" duty.75 Again, because the net worth of the goods serves as the
base factor in the duty equation, the amount at which the goods are
appraised greatly concerns the importer: the lower the value of the goods,
the lower the duty imposed.76
a substantial transformation test to a tariff shift test as required by paragraph 1 of Annex 311 of
NAFTA).
69. CLUBB, supra note 34, § 19.5.2, at 385; Routh, supra note 59, at 47.
70. The Uruguay Round of GATT requires signatory nations to "use market transaction prices for
valuation, as opposed to published list prices, or administered control prices." JOE COBB, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION REPORTS, BACKGROUNDER REP. No. 985, A GUIDE TO THiE NEW GATT AGREEMENT
(1994). See generally, Michael E. Roll, Nissho lwai American Corp. v. United States: Customs
Appraisement and Middleman Pricing Under Section 402 of the TariffAct of 1930, 17 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 190 (1993).
71. See 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(a)(1)(A) (1988). The commercial invoice is used for this purpose.
CLUBB, supra note 34, § 19.4, at 382. However, the value appearing on the commercial invoice often
requires certain deductions or additions in order to reflect the correct transaction value. Roll, supra note
70, at 197; Routh, supra note 59, at 50-51. See also 19 U.S.C. §§ 1401a(b)(I), 1401a(b)(3) (1988).
72. CLUBB, supra note 34, § 19.5.2, at 386; Routh, supra note 59, at 50. These methodologies are
mandated by GATT. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,402 (1979) (implemented by The Trade Agreements Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1980)). See also Roll, supra note 70, at 198 (discussing the
history of the U.S. and GATT provisions).
73. CLUBB, supra note 34, § 19.5.2, at 386-87; Routh, supra note 59, at 50.
74. For a detailed discussion of these methodologies, see Izzet M. Sinan, European Community
Customs Duties: A Significant Trading Consideration for U.S. Companies, 18 W. MITCHELL L. REV.
401, 423 (1992).
75. SCHMECKEBIER, supra note 49, at 33. Although not relevant to § 304, two other types of duties
exist: specific and compound. A specific duty is a charge per quantitative unit, "such as the duty of 35
cents a bushel of wheat." A compound duty incorporates both ad valorem and specific duties, resulting
in, for example, the duty on "benzoic acid, which is... 2Y2 cents a pound plus 15 per cent on the
value." Id.
76. See id. at 34-35.
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b) Regulatory Responsibilities: Checking for Marking
In contrast to classification and valuation, which result directly in the
collection of duties and therefore, constitute fiscal activities, section 304
requires Customs to perform a regulatory function.77 The ultimate goal of
trade regulation is "to foster, protect, control, and restrain" trade for the
purpose of advancing domestic commerce." According to section 304, if
goods are not conspicuously, legibly, and permanently marked with the
English name of the country in which they were produced, Customs must
exclude them from entry.79 If the importer chooses to comply with the
statute and properly marks the goods, Customs will not impose the ten
percent duty on the shipment."0 Based on legislative history and the
practical operation of the statute, it is clear that the aim of the marking
statute is to "restrain" entry of unmarked goods in order to "foster" and
"protect" United States industry by capitalizing on nationalist sentiment.8"
The ten percent duty is merely one of several sanctions used to enforce
compliance with the law.82 Thus, enforcement of section 304 cannot be
construed as a fiscal activity; instead, it is a regulatory activity.
B. The Procedural Law: Keeping Imports Out
The activities described above illustrate the extent of Customs'
discretion, whether it involves choosing one of 8,000 overlapping HTSUS
headings or determining whether a tar-covered, but die-sunk, country of
origin mark on a pipe is conspicuous. Needless to say, any given Customs'
decision has the potential to make those affected by it unhappy or confused.
To address these concerns, the tariff and trade statutes provide importers
and other interested parties with various methods to clarify or dispute
77. Id. at 74.
78. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1286 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Virginian Ry. Co. v. System
Federation No. 40, 84 F.2d 641, 650 (4th Cir. 1936), aff'd, 300 U.S. 515 (1937)).
79. 19 C.F.R. § 134.51 (1994). For the text of this section, see supra note 38.
80. 19 U.S.C. § 1304(f) (1988). The section provides that the 10% duty will only be imposed if
the mismarked or unmarked goods are not re-exported, destroyed, or made to conform. Id. Additionally,
the duty will be imposed even if the goods are not subject to any "ordinary customs duties." Id.
81. See Unites States v. American Sponge & Chamois Co., 16 Ct. Cust. 61, 66 (Ct. Cust. App.
1928) ("The [marking] law was not intended so much to derive revenue as it was to protect the
American manufacturer and purchaser of the merchandise.").
82. For a discussion of other available sanctions, see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the role of the 10% penalty duty, see supra note 37.
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Customs' decisions." Should an interested party avail itself of one of
these methods and then disagree with Customs' ruling on the issue, the
party may challenge that ruling.84 Depending on the type of dispute
resolution procedure employed by the party, specific administrative appeal
procedures may exist." If so, the party must follow these procedures in
order to "exhaust its administrative remedies" and place the case within the
jurisdiction of the courts.8 6 If administrative appeal procedures do not
apply to the situation or do not afford an adequate remedy, the party may
take its case to the Court of International Trade ("CIT") and, on the
appellate level, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC").87
1. Pre-Norcal/Crosetti: Section 177 Letter Rulings
Prior to the Norcal/Crosetti case,8 which expressly ordered the use of
83. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514-16 (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 177 (1994). For a discussion of §§ 1514-
15, see infra note 98.
84. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1993) (describing the occasions upon which the CIT may
hear such a challenge).
85. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. §§ 175.22, 175.23 (1994).
86. American Air Parcel Forwarding Co., Ltd. v. United States, 557 F. Supp. 605 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1983), aft'd, 718 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984).
87. Customs controversies are heard exclusively by the CIT. 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1993); Comet
Stores v. Morton, 632 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 937 (1981). Congress created the
CIT in 1980 to replace the United States Customs Court. Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
417, 94 Stat. 1727 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 293(a) (1988)). Appeals are heard by the CAFC, formerly
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1994); Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 38 (codified as amended in various sections of Title 28
of the United States Code)).
The statute defining the jurisdiction of the CIT, 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1993), has been criticized by
commentators as confusing and arbitrary. See Gregory W. Carman, Jurisdiction and the Court of
International Trade: Remark of the Honorable Gregory W. Carman at the Conference on International
Business Practice Presented by the Centerfor Dispute Resolution on February 27-28, 1992, 13 J. INT'L
L. Bus. 245, 250 (1992) ("If Congress had set out to create a jurisdictional gauntlet for litigants, it is
difficult to imagine how it could have designed a better system than that which has resulted since the
enactment of the Customs Courts Act of 1980."). Thus, a comprehensive analysis of the jurisdictional
questions raised by Norcal/Crosetti is beyond the scope of this Note. This Note does, however, present
the arguments on jurisdiction raised by counsel in Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States Customs
Service, 731 F. Supp. 510 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990), and the court's rulings on them. See infra part II.C.2.
For further discussion of the CIT's history, formation, jurisdiction, and operations, see Eugene C.
Brooks, The Customs Courts Act of 1980-Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1785 (to be Codified in
Scattered Sections of Titles 19 and 28 U.S.C.), 7 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 85 (1982) (a step-by-
step analysis of the legislative provisions); Joseph S. Kaplan, Litigation in the Court of International
Trade, 17 AM. J. TPJAL ADVOC. 719 (1994) (illustrating procedure in the forum by way of sample
cases); David E. Ovaska, Customs Courts Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 1727, 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 239
(1982).
88. Norcal/Crosetti Foods v. United States Customs Service, 963 F.2d 356 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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the section 516 procedure for marking issues, domestic manufacturers
would raise concerns about Customs' interpretation of the marking statute
by requesting binding 9 letter rulings, as provided for in 19 C.F.R.
§ 177.9) In a letter ruling, Customs replies in writing to an inquiry9t
made by any interested party.92 Customs states its "definitive interpretation
of applicable law" with respect to a given fact pattern.93 In its inquiry, the
interested party may suggest the conclusion that it believes Customs should
reach if the party provides the basis for the assertion and cites "all relevant
supporting authority."94 When a ruling made under section 177 results in
a change of Customs' practice and in either (1) a higher rate of duty or (2)
a restriction or prohibition on an import, Customs publishes the ruling in
the Federal Register and allows interested parties to comment.95 If, on the
other hand, Customs refuses to change its practice, the requesting party
they take its case to the CIT.96
89. 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(a) (1994) ("A ruling letter issued by the Customs Service under the
provisions of this part represents the official position of the Customs Service with respect to the
particular transaction or issue described therein and is binding on all Customs Service personnel...
until modified or revoked.").
90. 19 C.F.R. § 177 (1994). See, e.g., Letter to Hallett, supra note 7, at I n.1; Letter to Lobred,
supra note 7. Counsel initially submitted the ruling request on Jan. 21, 1992, without reference to
statutory or regulatory provisions. Letter to Lobred, supra note 7. Customs rejected the request as
contrary to the holding of NorcalCrosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 963 F.2d 356 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
and required resubmission in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1516, as implemented by 19 C.F.R. § 175.1.
Letter to Hallett, supra note 7, at I n. I (referring to a March 18, 1992 letter from John Durant, Director
of the Commercial Rulings Division). The initial letter, dated January 21, provides evidence that such
informal letters regarding marking issues were an accepted practice before Norcal/Crosetti. See Letter
to Lobred, supra note 7.
91. "A request for a ruling should be in the form of a letter." 19 C.F.R. § 177.2(a) (1994).
92. 19 C.F.R. § 177.1(c) (1994). This subsection provides that "any person who, as an importer
or exporter of merchandise, or otherwise, has a direct and demonstrable interest in the question" may
request a ruling under § 177. Id.
93. 19 C.F.R. §§ 177.1(a)(1), (d)(l) (1994). The request must "contain a complete statement of
all relevant facts ... in sufficient detail to permit the proper application of relevant Customs and related
laws." 19 C.F.IR § 177.2(b)(1) (1994). "Customs and related laws" are defined as "any provision of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended .... or the Customs Regulations." 19 C.F.R. § 177.1(d)(5) (1994).
Additionally, an importer or interested party must request a letter ruling in advance of importation and
cannot request a ruling on goods currently the object of a dispute. 19 C.F.R. § 177.1(a)(1) (1994).
94. 19 C.F.R. § 177.2(b)(6) (1994).
95. 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(c) (1994).
96. The CIT may take jurisdiction because no specific appeal procedures are listed for adverse
letter rulings. See 19 C.F.R. § 177 (1994). Also, jurisdiction in such cases is explicitly allowed under
the CIT's jurisdictional statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) (1993). Section 1581(h) provides that "[t]he Court
of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to review ...
a refusal to issue or change ... a ruling, relating to classification, rate of duty, marking, restricted
merchandise, entry requirements ... or similar matters." Id. As a matter of statutory construction, it is
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2. Post-Norcal/Crosetti: Section 516 Domestic InterestedParty Petitions
Section 516 of the Tariff Act97 is another ruling and appeal mecha-
nism98 available to domestic interested parties99 to protest Customs'
decisions concerning the classification, valuation, or duty ratet00 of an
import. t"' If a domestic interested party disagrees with Customs' assessment
of a particular import, the party may file a petition requesting a ruling on
the accuracy of the assessment and may set forth the rate of duty it believes
proper.1"2 Customs then publishes notice in the Federal Register that a
petition has been filed and opens the issue to written comment.'0 3 If
interesting to note that Congress was aware of the differences between these categories of disputes, but
chose to include only the first three in § 516. Id.
97. 19 U.S.C. § 1516 (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 175 (1994) (implementing § 1516).
98. In addition to § 516 and § 177, other administrative dispute resolution procedures include those
contained in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514-15. Section 514 allows importers and others with a monetary interest
in a particular shipment concerning Customs decisions on value, classification, exclusion, liquidation,
drawback, and other charges to file protests. 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1993). Section 515 deals with
reconsideration of decisions made under § 514 and accelerates disposition of such appeals. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1515 (1993).
99. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(2) (1988). An interested party is defined as:
(A) a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States;
(B) a certified union.., which is representative of an industry engaged in the manufacture,
production, or wholesale in the United States; or
(C) a trade or business association a majority of whose members are manufacturers,
producers, or wholesalers in the United States, of goods of the same class or kind as the
designated imported merchandise.
Id.
100. The provision does not define valuation, classification, or rate of duty in this context. See 19
U.S.C. § 1516 (1988). However, for a discussion of these concepts, see supra part II.A.2.
101. The text of the provision provides that "[t]he Secretary (of the Treasury] shall, upon written
request by an interested party furnish the classification and the rate of duty imposed upon designated
imported merchandise of a class or kind manufactured, produced, or sold at wholesale by such
interested party." 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(1) (1988).
102. Id. The petition must set forth:
(A) a description of the merchandise,
(B) the appraised value, the classification, or the rate of duty that it believes proper, and
(C) the reasons for its belief.
Id. For a discussion of the implications of subsection (B), see infra note 165 and accompanying text.
103. 19 C.F.R. § 175.21(a) (1994). This initial publication is not mandated by the statute, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516 (1988), but is provided for only in the Customs regulations. See 19 C.F.R. § 175.21(a) (1994).
Further, the regulation does not specify the length of time during which the opportunity to comment
must remain open. Id. The Administrative Procedures Act requires that publication of proposed
substantive rules "be made not less than 30 days before its effective 1994 date." 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)
(1994). Customs' practice, however, is to provide close to sixty days notice and comment opportunity.
See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 6464 (1995) (published Feb. 2, 1995, comments due Mar. 20, 1995); 59 Fed.
Reg. 14,579 (1994) (published Mar. 29, 1994, comments due May 31, 1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 10,764-65
(1994) (comments due "60 days" after publication); 58 Fed. Reg. 47,413 (1993) (published Sept. 9,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss4/6
1995] MARKING REQUIREMENTS 1695
Customs determines that its original assessment was erroneous, Customs
notifies the petitioner and publishes the amended assessment." 4 If, on the
other hand, Customs believes the assessment to be correct, only the
petitioner is notified and no publication follows. 05 Should the petitioner
disagree with the ruling, it must file notice of a desire to contest, 0 6 which
Customs again publishes in the Federal Register. 7 If the petitioner
receives another negative determination, only then, having exhausted all
administrative remedies, may it take the case before the courts.'t 5
C. The Caselaw
Despite the importance of the Norcal/Crosetti holding0 9 for current
manufacturers, the issues raised in the case regarding the section 516
procedure are not new. Two pre-Norcal/Crosetti cases, Bradford Co. v.
American Lithograph"' and Way Distributors v. United States,"' illus-
trate the judicial disagreement over the purpose and scope of section 516.
Specifically, debate has centered around whether marking issues can be
considered classification or rate of duty disputes for purposes of section
516 and whether section 516 is an exclusive remedy for all issues raised by
domestic manufacturers.
1. Pre-Norcal/Crosetti: Judicial Disagreement
In Bradford Co. v. American Lithographic Co.," 2 the Court of Cus-
1993, comments due November 8, 1993).
It is beyond the scope of this Note to delve into the complexities of the Administrative Procedures
Act and other administrative law. This Note confines discussion of notice-and-comment rights to those
required by the Customs regulations for the § 516 procedure and § 177 letter rulings.
104. 19 C.F.R. § 175.22(a) (1994).
105. 19 C.F.R. § 175.22(b) (1994).
106. 19 C.F.R.L § 175.23 (1994).
107. 19 C.F.R. § 175.24 (1994). The provision does not explicitly require opportunity to comment.
Id. However, it appears that Customs' practice is to allow comments if marking issues are pursued
under § 516. See, e.g., Country-of-Origin Marking Requirement on Frozen Produce Packages, 56 Fed.
Reg. 24115 (1991). Assuming, arguendo, that this is not the case, it seems likely that a notice of
petitioner's desire to contest will draw interested party comments if such parties also filed comments
when the issue was first published. Furthermore, it seems that this is realistically the only purpose for
publication of the notice to contest.
108. For a discussion of the CIT and CAFC, see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
109. NorcallCrosetti Foods v. United States Customs Service, 963 F.2d 356 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
110. 12 Ct. Cust. 318 (Ct. Cust. App. 1924).
111. 653 F.2d 467 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
112. 12 Ct. Cust. at 318.
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toms Appeals 13 held that failure to properly mark per section 304 was
a classification issue within the purview of section 516.14 Because the
marking issue was a classification dispute, the jurisdiction of the lower
court, which was limited to classification and rate of duty disputes," 5 was
properly invoked.1 6 In that case, the plaintiff filed its marking protest
under section 516, alleging improper classification and improper rate of
duty."7 In condoning the use of the section 516 procedure, the court
reasoned that the determination of whether a good belonged in the group
of legally marked goods or the group of illegally marked goods constituted
classification."' Because a good's classification into one of these two
groups determined whether the additional ten percent duty applied, the
court held that the dispute was also properly a rate of duty dispute."9
Thus, plaintiff was entitled to bring its marking protest under section
516.120
In Way Distributors v. Unites States,' the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals held that while section 516 was one available avenue for
filing a classification protest, it was not the only method open to domestic
producers." z The court stated that:
113. The Court of Customs Appeals reviewed decisions of the Board of General Appraisers, the
body which heard Bradford in the first instance. Doherty, supra note 43, at 312-20 (discussing the
history and operations of the Board); see also supra note 87 (discussing the Customs Court and the
CIT). In 1926, the Board of General Appraisers was converted into the Customs Court, the predecessor
of the CIT. Tariff Act of 1926, ch. 411, §§ 1, 2, 44 Stat. 669 (1926), repealed by Customs Court Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
114. Bradford, 12 Ct. Cust. at 323-24.
115. See Doherty, supra note 43, at 312-20. The Board acquired specific jurisdiction over § 516
protests in 1922. Id. at 319 (citing Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 489, 42 Stat. 858 (1922), repealed
by Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 651(a)(1), 46 Stat. 590, 762 (1930) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 378
(1982)). Only when Congress created the CIT did the line of Customs courts gain full Article III
powers. Id. at 340.
116. Bradford, 12 Ct. Cust. at 324.
117. Id. at 319.
118. Id. at 323. This argument seems to be a bit of a stretch. In general trade usage, classification
refers only to HTSUS classification.
119. Id. at 323-24.
120. See also Diamond Match Co. v. United States, 49 C.C.P.A. 52 (1962). In Diamond Match, like
Bradford, the plaintiff specifically alleged improper rate of duty, which Norcal/Crosetti did not. Id. at
52; see Bradford, 12 Cust. Ct. at 319; Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States Customs Service,
731 F. Supp. 510, 511 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990).
121. 653 F.2d 467 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
122. Id. at 467. This holding was later overruled in the context of strict classification disputes by
Nat'l Corn Growers Ass'n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1988). National Corn Growers left
much room for doubt as to whether the same held true for marking issues, however. See
Norcal/Crosetti, 731 F. Supp. at 516 ("In so holding [that § 516 provided the exclusive method for
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Interested parties may communicate their views to the agency at any time and
in any manner not inconsistent with statute or law. The existence of Section
516 ... does not mean that [it] is the only permissible way for American
Manufacturers to attempt to bring about a change in import classification.'"3
The court also stated that although the importer safeguard provisions
present in the section 516 procedure do not exist when a domestic party
uses a more informal procedure, the lack of such safeguards did "not
deprive the Customs Service of the authority to issue an interpretative
ruling."'24 Thus, the court held that section 516 was not an exclusive
remedy procedure for domestic interested parties.' 5
2. Norcal/Crosetti: The Debate Resolved
Aorcal/Crosetti'1 6 resolved this long-standing debate by holding that
(1) marking was indeed a classification/rate of duty dispute and (2) section
516 was the only manner in which domestic manufacturers could bring
such issues to the attention of the government.'27 The case involved three
opinions: two CIT decisions, hereinafter referred to collectively as
Norcal/Crosetti J,128 and a CAFC decision, hereinafter referred to as
Norcal/Crosetti 11.129
a) Norcal/Crosetti I (1990)
In May of 1988, Norcal/Crosetti and two other California-based frozen
produce packers requested a binding ruling from Customs that country-of-
origin marks on the back panels of packages of frozen vegetables did not
American manufacturers to challenge classification and rate of duty, the CAFC] implicitly ruled that
if, as domestic industry claimed, the matter at issue involved a subject other than classification and rate
of duty, jurisdiction of [the CIT] under 1581(i) [residual jurisdiction] might be permissible.').
123. Way Distributors, 653 F.2d at 467.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 471.
126. Norcal/Crosetti Foods v. United States Customs Service, 763 F.2d 356 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
127. Id. at 359-60.
128. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 758 F. Supp. 729 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1991); Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 731 F. Supp. 510 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1990). In the 1990 case, the CIT denied Customs' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 731 F.
Supp. at 515. In the 1991 case, the CIT granted Norcal/Crosetti's motion for summary judgment,
deciding the merits of the case, 758 F. Supp. 510 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991).
129. 963 F.2d 356 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this appeal, the CAFC reversed the CIT and ordered the CIT
holding vacated for want of jurisdiction. Id. at 360.
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meet section 304's requirements of conspicuousness.'3 ° At the end of
November of 1988, Customs responded by issuing a ruling letter denying
Norcal/Crosetti's request.'3' Customs stated that because the markings
were legible and located near the nutritional information and expiration
date, they satisfied both section 304 and Customs Regulation section
134.41(b).1 32 Following this denial, Norcal/Crosetti filed suit against
Customs in the CIT, claiming that because foreign-grown vegetables posed
greater health risks than domestically-grown vegetables, consumers had a
right to make an informed decision concerning the purchase of such
vegetables.' 33 In order to have this opportunity, the country of origin had
to be marked "conspicuously" per the legislative intent of section 304,
which meant on the front panels. 3 4 Norcal/Crosetti sought injunctive
relief, claiming that Customs interpretation of the conspicuousness
requirement was incorrect. 135
Customs immediately challenged the CIT's jurisdiction and moved to
dismiss, claiming that Norcal/Crosetti's request for a ruling was ultimately
a section 516 petition not properly before the court.' 36 Customs argued
first that because it had failed to assess the ten percent ad valorem duty
applicable to mismarked goods, Norcal/Crosetti's marking question was
actually a classification issue. '31 Customs then reasoned that such
classification disputes were necessarily governed by section 516.138
Jurisdiction for CIT review of section 516 proceedings is granted by
§ 1581(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code.'39 Customs contended
130. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 758 F. Supp. 729,731 (Ct. Int'l.
Trade 1991), vacated, 790 F. Supp. 302 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992). A large rise in frozen vegetable imports
that were adversely affecting the domestic industry motivated Norcal/Crosetti to seek the rulings. Id.
131. Priv. Ltr. Rul. HRL 731830 (Nov. 21, 1988).
132. Id.
133. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, 758 F. Supp. at 732.
134. Id.
135. See Norcal/Crosetti Foods, 963 F.2d 356, 358 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reversing the CIT's decision
on the issue of jurisdiction).
136. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, 731 F. Supp. 510 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990) (separate opinion denying
Customs' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction).
137. Id. at 512. The fallacy of this argument lies in the fact that the 10% duty is only applied to
goods that have already been imported and sold to consumers; thus, the duty is a retrospective penalty.
See supra note 37. However, Norcal/Crosetti sought prospective relief in the form of a revised standard.
731 F. Supp. at 512. See also 19 C.F.R. § 177.1(a)(1) (1994).
138. Id.
139. Section 1581(b) provides simply that "[tihe Court of International Trade shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced under § 516 of the TariffAct of 1930." 28 U.S.C. § 1581(b)
(1993).
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that because Norcal/Crosetti had failed to exhaust its administrative
remedies pursuant to section 516, Norcal/Crosetti did not meet the
jurisdictional prerequisites for filing a claim in the court under
§ 1581(b).140
In response, Norcal/Crosetti argued that the request for a determination
of the propriety of the country of origin marking was not a classification
or rate of duty dispute, but an "action ... providing for ... administra-
tion or enforcement" of section 304.t41 Section 1581(i)(4) of Title 28 of
the United States Code, commonly referred to as the CIT's "residual
jurisdiction" clause, provides the CIT with immediate and exclusive
jurisdiction of administration and enforcement claims, 42 so long as the
claim could not have been brought under any other clause within
§ 1581.143 Norcal/Crosetti argued that because section 516 was inapplica-
ble, the residual jurisdiction clause was the proper basis for jurisdic-
tion.'" The CIT agreed with Norcal/Crosetti and rejected Customs'
assertion that plaintiffs could have used § 1581(b). The CIT held that
because the complaint did not involve a classification or rate of duty
dispute governed by section 516, 145 the CIT could properly take jurisdic-
tion pursuant to the residual jurisdiction clause.1 46
One year after this preliminary ruling on jurisdiction and over two and
one half years after Norcal/Crosetti's initial ruling request, the court
decided the merits of the case, holding that Customs had indeed misinter-
preted the requirements of section 304.t47 The court found that the
140. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, 731 F. Supp. at 512-13.
141. Id. at 515 n.7 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4)).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) (1993). The residual jurisdiction clause provides:
(i) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of International Trade by
subsections (a) - (h) of this section and subject to the exception set forth in subsection (j) of
this section, the Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
action commenced against the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any
law of the United States providing for...
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in... subsections
(a) - (h) of this section.
Id.
143. See Miller & Co. v. United States, 824 F.2d 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cited in Norcal/Crosetti
Foods, 731 F. Supp. at 531 ("Section 1581(i) jurisdiction may not be invoked when jurisdiction under
another subsection of § 1581 is or could have been available, unless the remedy provided under that
other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.").
144. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, 731 F. Supp. at 514.
145. Id. at 521-33.
146. Id. at 515.
147. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, 758 F. Supp. at 741-42. The decision resulted in the granting of
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 742.
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manner in which frozen vegetables were sold to the consumer was
prohibitive of package inspection. 48 Interpreting Congress' intent in
drafting section 304, the court found that the country-of-origin mark located
on the rear panel was not conspicuous. 49 The Court ordered Customs to
rescind their letter ruling and to issue a new one within 90 days. 0 The
new letter was to find that, in order for frozen vegetables to comply with
the requirements of section 304, the "country of origin marking must be
located on the front panel of the package and must be marked in a type
size and style so as to be conspicuous."' '
b) Norcal/Crosetti II (1992)
On appeal, the CAFC reversed the CIT's decision for lack of jurisdic-
tion."' The court rejected the notion that plaintiffs could not have
secured the desired relief-a ruling on the proper interpretation of section
304-by proceeding under section 51653 Because jurisdiction under the
residual jurisdiction clause is improper if any other clause could have been
used, the court held that plaintiffs could have secured jurisdiction under
§ 1581(b) had they used the section 516 procedure.'54 Thus, plaintiffs'
failure to exhaust the administrative remedies of section 516 precluded
plaintiffs from securing jurisdiction under § 1581(b), and their failure to
use section 516 in the first place precluded them from securing jurisdiction
under the residual jurisdiction clause.'55 Implicitly, the court held that a
domestic manufacturer seeking to influence Customs' interpretation of
section 304 must proceed under section 516 to ensure judicial review of
Customs' ruling on the issue.
III. ANALYSIS
Norcal/Crosetti represents judicial policy-making in an attempt to
148. Id. at 733.
149. Id. at 735-36.
150. Id. at 742.
151. Id.
152. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, 963 F.2d 356, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
153. Id. at 359. The court stated that a § 516 classification and rate of duty challenge raise the issue
of whether Customs failed to impose a 10% ad valorem duty on mismarked goods. Id. This argument
necessarily requires a determination of whether the goods were in fact mismarked. Id. at 359-60.
Diamond Match evidences the validity of this argument. Diamond Match Co. v. United States, 49
C.C.P.A. 52, 59 (1962). But see supra note 137 (discussing the timing of the requested relief).
154. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, 963 F.2d at 359.
155. See id. at 359-60.
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balance the statutorily-granted rights of domestic industry with the due
process needs of importers. By requiring domestic interested parties to use
section 516 for marking issues, the court intended for petitioners to be able
to present their case to Customs, while ensuring notice-and-comment
opportunities for importers on the issues raised in the petition. 5 6 While
the court's motives were proper, the solution was not. From both a legal
and a functional standpoint, the use of section 516 fails to ensure fairness
on either side of the balance.
A. In Theory: The Poor Fit of Sections 304 and 516
In terms of legal theory, section 304 and section 516 have dissimilar
underlying strategies and are thus poorly paired. Using the section 516
procedure to present section 304 marking issues is similar to using tax
evasion to put away Al Capone: While it might do the job, it skirts the real
issue. Section 516 procedure deals with fiscal activities and results in a
"fiscal" remedy, while section 304 is a substantive provision for which
"interpretive" remedies are necessary. Therefore, the two provisions are ill-
suited to work together.
1. The Ends and the Means: Regulatory versus Fiscal
Section 516 gives domestic interested parties a method to dispute
classification, valuation, and rate of duty, i.e., fiscal activities.'57 The
result of these fiscal activities is the imposition and collection of du-
ties. 5 Duties raise revenue for the government while increasing the
prices of imports.'59 Increased prices in turn lower the competitiveness
of imports in the American market.
On the other hand, section 304 has a regulatory function. 6 It prohibits
goods from entering the market if they do not comply with certain
requirements, such as being conspicuously and legibly marked with their
country of origin. 6' When goods bear the proper marks, they, like
dutiable goods, enter the market at a competitive disadvantage. However,
the disadvantage is not based on price, but rather on more subjective
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 50, 97-101 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
159. Again, these were the original goals of United States trade law. For legislative history of the
first duty provision, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
1995] 1701
Washington University Open Scholarship
1702 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
characteristics, such as perceived quality and nationalist sentiment. 62 For
example, an American-made shirt may be less price-competitive than one
made in China, but the purchaser's allegiance to domestic products may
negate that disadvantage. Thus, while the ends of the two provisions may
be the same, the means are quite different.
2. Relief Sought versus Relief Received
When domestic manufacturers raise section 304 issues, they are not
concerned with price competitiveness, but rather with "subjective"
competitiveness. 63 For this reason, they do not seek an additional ten
percent duty as relief, but instead a more conspicuous or legible country of
origin mark. 64 Under section 516, a petitioner is allowed to state the
"appraised value, classification, or rate of duty it believes proper."'65
Thus, a domestic manufacturer filing a protest under section 516 can only
assert that the importer should have been assessed a duty ten percent higher
than whatever Customs actually charged.
Under section 177, on the other hand, the domestic manufacturer was
able to state what it believed to be the correct interpretation of the
conspicuous or legible requirements of section 304 given the facts at
hand. 166 As succinctly stated in Norcal/Crosetti, domestic producers
"could care less about the 'appraised value, classification or rate of
duty.""' 67 The real concern is the mark itself.168 Thus, section 516 fails
to address the true issues raised by domestic manufacturers' section 304
disputes.
B. In Actuality: Negative Implications of Section 516
In addition to the academic arguments against using the section 516
procedure for marking issues, practical arguments also advise against its
use. For the petitioner, section 516 is an exercise in redundancy, resulting
in lost time, money, and market share. For the importer, section 516
achieves little in the way of increased meaningful due process. On both
sides of the equation, section 516 results in negatives.
162. See supra notes 34, 41 and accompanying text.
163. See Letter to Lobred, supra note 7, at 4.
164. Id.
165. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(1)(B) (1988). For the text of this provision, see supra note 101.
166. 19 C.F.R. § 177.2(b)(6) (1994). See supra notes 92, 93 and accompanying text.
167. 963 F.2d at 360.
168. See id.
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1. Increased Burdens on Petitioning Parties
As argued in Norcal/Crosetti II, "the [section 516] process takes too
long, given the economic background, for the meaningless gesture of taking
product by product and asking Customs to change views so recently
expressed in the [first] ruling." 169 When a domestic producer files a
request for a section 177 letter ruling, Customs immediately begins
formulating a response.' If the requesting party does not receive the
response it desires, it may file suit with the CIT.171
In comparison, when a party files a section 516 protest, the petition is
summarized by Customs, the issues are published in the Federal Register,
and the status quo is preserved for sixty days while interested parties have
the opportunity to comment.'7 2 After comments have been received, read,
and tabulated, Customs makes a determination and notifies the petition-
er.173 If the determination does not conform to the petitioner's wishes, the
petitioner must compose and file a notice of contest. 74 Again, the notice
is summarized by Customs, published, and possibly opened for another
sixty day comment period.'75
This red tape imposes an unnecessary burden on domestic producers. It
is difficult to imagine that the comments received after the second notice
publication differ in substance from those received after the first. Further,
it is unlikely that Customs will change its position in the hiatus between the
tWo. t7' Thus, throughout this lengthy and redundant process, no check on
imports is effected, costs for petitioners are increased, and access to the
courts is restricted.
2. Lack of Increased Due Process for Affected Importers
While the redundant section 516 process results in tangible detriment to
petitioners, importers likewise receive no meaningful due process benefits
169. Id. The first point in this statement, that the process is too lengthy, is only accurate when taken
in conjunction with the second statement, that the process is redundant. In other words, while § 516 is
not lengthy when compared to a protracted court battle, it remains unnecessarily redundant.
170. See supra part II.B.I.
171. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 104, 105 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
176. While it is unlikely, it is admitted that it is not out of the realm of possibility. For an example
see infra note 178.
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from the additional notice-and-comment opportunity. First, it is question-
able that publication in the Federal Register provides actual notice to the
majority of importers. Unless a company has counsel or a particular
manager or department assigned to the task of perusing the Federal Register
on a daily basis for mention of its products, it seems unlikely that it would
hear about an issue on a timely basis. Second, and perhaps most important-
ly, Customs is an executive agency, subject to the policy designs of the
current administration.'77 In other words, from a policy standpoint,
Customs' views on an issue are not susceptible to change, regardless of
input from importers. If the administration favors free trade, importers'
comments will be cited with approval. If the administration leans to
protectionism, however, comments from importers will make little
difference. 7' Thus, while notice-and-comment opportunity for importers
is generally desirable,'7 9 in practice, the redundancy of section 516 results
in little meaningful benefit. The interests of importers would be better
addressed in the context of an impartial judicial setting, such as the CIT or
arbitration.'8 °
IV. PROPOSAL
Because neither section 177 nor section 516 adequately balance the
177. See generally MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AS
INSTRUMENTS OF POLITICAL CONTROL (Center for the Study of American Business Working Paper No.
109, 1987). In this discussion of public notice-and-comment procedures, the authors note that the public
process "affords numerous opportunities for political principals to respond when an agency seeks to
move in a direction that officials do not like." Id. at 27-28.
178. One example of this agency predisposition is found in the Norcal/Crosetti saga. After
Norcal/Crosetti lost the court battle, they resubmitted their marking concerns in the form of a § 516
petition. This second petition resulted in the response that Norcal/Crosetti desired-at the White House's
suggestion. Apparently, front panel marking on frozen vegetables was granted in exchange for a House
representative's affirmative vote on NAFTA. See American Frozen Food Institute v. United States, 855
F. Supp. 388, 416-17 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994).
179. In addition to simply being "desirable," notice-and-comment opportunities are required by
GAIT in this situation. See supra note 24. In fact, this is the downfall of letter rulings: that § 177
affords no notice-and-comment opportunity before Customs makes a decision. See generally, William
D. Araiza, Notice-and-Comment Rights for Administrative Decisions Affecting International Trade:
Heightened Need, No Response, 99 YALE L.J. 669 (1989).
180. See North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States, Dec. 17, 1992,
art. 1805 (G.P.O. 1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] ("Each Party shall establish and maintain judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative tribunals... [which are] impartial and independent of the office or authority
entrusted with administrative enforcement.').
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interests of importers and domestic manufacturers,181 Congress should
adapt NAFTA dispute resolution procedures to govern marking disputes
over goods from all countries. 2 Customs initiated the idea of global
application of certain NAFTA provisions in January of 1994, when, in
fulfillment of its NAFTA obligations, it changed the manner in which it
determined origin for Canadian and Mexican imports.'83 In the Federal
Register announcement immediately following that change, Customs further
proposed applying the new method to all imports. 8 4 While it is beyond
the scope of Customs' authority to adapt NAFTA's substantive dispute
resolution procedures for marking issues to apply on a multinational basis,
it is well within the realm of Congress' power.
Chapters 5 and 18 of NAFTA provide interested parties with a clear and
well-balanced framework for resolving Customs issues. Congress could
easily adapt this framework to cover goods from all countries.' Chapter
5 contains two sections addressing administrative review procedures,
sections C and . 86 Because section C only covers prospective marking
questions submitted by importers, domestic manufacturers may not use
section C's "Advance Ruling" provisions to raise concerns about the
interpretation of the "conspicuous" and "legible" marking requirements. 8 7
It appears, however, that domestic manufacturers are entitled to inquire
181 . For a discussion of § 177's lack of pre-decision notice-and-comment opportunity, see supra
note 179. For a discussion of the problems of § 516, see supra part III.
182. See NAFTA, supra note 180, at chs. 5, 18, 19. Chapter 5 covers "Customs Procedures."
Chapter 18 covers "Publication, Notification and Administration of Laws." Chapter 19 addresses
"Review and Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Matters." Id.
183. Rules for Determining the Country of Origin of a Good for Purposes of Annex 311 of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 59 Fed. Reg. 110 (1994) [hereinafter Annex 311 Marking Rules
Annex 311 Marking Rules]. For a discussion of the rules of origin, substantial transformation, and tariff
shift classification tests, see supra notes 67 and 68. Note that Annex 31 1's "Marking Rules" establish
a good's origin for purposes of marking when the good is from any country. See Annex 311 Marking
Rules, supra, at ch. 4. NAFTA's Chapter 4, "Rules of Origin," is in actuality a provision for local
content for determining preferential treatment. Id.
184. Rules of Origin Applicable to Imported Merchandise, 59 Fed. Reg. 141 (1994) (to be codified
at 19 C.F.R. §§ 4, 10, 12, 102, 134, 177).
185. See NAFTA, supra note 180, at ch. 5, arts. 509-510.
186. Id.
187. See NAFTA, supra note 180, at art. 509. Article 509 addresses advance rulings, providing:
1. Each Party shall, through its Customs administration, provide for the expeditious issuance
of written advance rulings, prior to importation of a good into its territory, to an importer in
its territory or an exporter or a producer in the territory of another Party... concerning:
(g) whether the proposed or actual marking of a good satisfies country of origin marking
requirements under Article 311 (Country of Origin Marking).
Id. at art. 509(l)(g). This provision corresponds to 19 C.F.R. § 177 (1994).
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about the interpretation of marking requirements"' by using Section D,
"Review and Appeal of Origin Determinations and Advance Rulings." This
review provision requires Customs first to provide administrative review
and second, to allow access to judicial or quasi-judicial appellate re-
view. 189
A. Level One: Administrative Review
To adapt the framework of Chapter 5 to apply to goods from all
countries, Congress must first create a means for the initial administrative
review. Congress could easily effect this by amending section 516. First,
the amendment would expressly state that the section 516 procedure applies
to marking issues. ° Because marking would be included in section 516 in
its own right and not shoe-homed into the rate of duty category, domestic
manufacturers would be able to put their preferred interpretations of section
304 before Customs and would not be limited to requesting the imposition
of a ten percent ad valorem duty. Second, the amendment would explicitly
188. See NAFTA, supra note 180, at art. 510. This section provides:
I. Each Party shall grant substantially the same rights of review and appeal of marking
determinations of origin, country of origin determinations and advance rulings by its customs
administration as it provides to importers in its territory to any person:
(a) who completes and signs a Certificate of Origin for a good that has been the subject of
a determination of origin;
(b) whose good has been the subject of a country of origin marking determination pursuant
to Article 311 (Country of Origin Marking); or
(c) who has received an advance ruling pursuant to Article 509().
Id. at art. 510(1)(a)-(c).
While subsection (b) does not specifically mention domestic producers, it appears that it was meant
to cover them. First, its differentiation from (c), which covers those domestic importers or foreign
manufacturers and exporters who received advance rulings, strongly suggests that (b) is meant to include
domestic manufacturers. Second, no other NAFTA provision allows for domestic manufacturer input
in marking issues. The key to subsection (b)'s construction lies in the term "whose good." If this means
"whose actual good," domestic manufacturers cannot be covered because their actual goods are not
subject to importation examinations. On the other hand, if the words of subsection (b) mean "whose
good" as a more abstract, "class or kind" descriptor, domestic manufacturers are included in the review
and appeal process. Because discussion in this section involves what Congress should legislate, this
Note assumes that subsection (b) includes domestic manufacturers. If in actuality it does not, the
deficiency could be remedied should Congress choose to legislate such provisions.
189. Id. at arts. 510(2)(a)-(b). This provision operates in conjunction with articles 1804 (Administra-
tive Proceedings) and 1805 (Review and Appeal). Id. at art. 510(2). The NAFTA provision provides
for a minimum of one administrative review. Id. at art. 510(2)(a).
190. Specifically, the last sentence of 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a)(1), which describes the contents of a
petition, would be moved to a separate section (a)(3), and the sections currently numbered (a)(2) and
(a)(3) would be renumbered (a)(4) and (a)(5). Then, a new section (a)(2) would be inserted containing
language stating that, in addition to (a)(1) rate of duty disputes, the procedure also covered disputes
arising from Customs' interpretations of the § 304 marking statute.
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provide for one Customs' review that includes a notice-and-comment
opportunity for affected importers prior to Customs' determination of the
issue. 9 After the administrative review, the amendment would allow a
dissatisfied petitioning party to appeal to the appropriate "judicial or quasi-
judicial" body. This would eliminate redundant, time-consuming proce-
dures.
B. Level Two: Independent Appellate Review
1. Option One: Court of International Trade
In keeping with Chapter 18 of NAFTA, which requires a reviewing body
to be independent of the agency enforcing the matter at issue, 92 Congress
has two choices with which to fulfill the "judicial or quasi-judicial' review
aspect of the framework provision. The first option designates the CIT to
act as the reviewing tribunal. This is the simpler approach, as the CIT's
jurisdictional statute already provides for exclusive jurisdiction over section
516 protest appeals and would require no amendment.'93 The CIT is the
logical choice also because of its history and expertise in Customs matters,
including marking, and the fact that it is already established and currently
available to litigants.'94 Further, parties could take advantage of additional
appellate review by the CAFC.'95 The downside of this approach results
from the fact that the CIT is indeed a well-established court. Litigants must
endure a potentially congested docket and the expense of a full legal battle.
However, these problems inhere in the nature of judicial review and should
be expected by those conducting business.
2. Option Two: NAFTA Chapter 19 Arbitral Panels
As a second option, Congress could establish an arbitral panel exclusive-
ly for marking disputes, similar to NAFTA's Chapter 19 bilateral panels for
antidumping and countervailing duty disputes.196 This could be offered
as an exclusive or an optional forum for parties involved in marking
191. This would require substantial reworking of 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516(b)-(C).
192. As a preliminary requirement, Chapter 18, Article 1805 states that thejudicial proceeding must
be "independent of the office or authority entrusted with administrative enforcement." NAFTA, supra
note 180, at art. 1805(1). This requirement eliminates control of the review by the politically-sensitive
Customs Service. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(b) (1988).
194. For a discussion of the CIT and CAFC and their history, see supra notes 87 and 113.
195. Id.
196. See NAFTA, supra note 180, at ch. 19, Annex 1901.2.
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disputes. Following the structure of Annex 1901.2, Congress could provide
a roster of potential panelists, chosen on the basis of good character and
reputation, objectivity, sound judgment and familiarity with international
trade law. 9 7 Each side in the dispute would choose two of the first four
panelists, and together the parties would agree on a fifth. 98 The panelists
would be bound by the same code of conduct as NAFTA panelists, thereby
ensuring their impartiality. 9 The procedural provisions established for
NAFTA panels would likewise apply.20
0
The benefits of small arbitral panels include the speed and binding nature
of the decisions. Involved parties would know the outcome of the case
more quickly, thereby avoiding product stockpiling and price fluctuations
resulting from speculation on the outcome of the case. On the other hand,
one disadvantage of this second option involves the make-up of the roster.
Because the panel would hear marking disputes regarding goods from all
countries, unlike the NAFTA panels, it could reasonably contain only
American panelists. This could lead to perceived unfairness by other
countries. However, the unfairness would be more perceived than actual,
as parties would fare no differently before an all-American CIT in terms of
nationalist favoritism. A second disadvantage to the arbitral panel is that
while panel decisions would likely be more equitable, they might tend to
be less uniform on the aggregate due to lack of binding case law. The
results of increased fairness to involved parties, however, outweigh any
superficial lack of predictability.
V. CONCLUSION
The unwavering advancement of technology over the course of the past
century has made our proverbially small world even smaller. The once
arcane world of international trade has become a fact of life for every
individual in the United States, from the manufacturer waiting on a
shipment of pig iron from New Guinea to the consumer at a local store
purchasing a Japanese television or a shirt made in Guatemala. This
197. Id. at annex 1901.2(1).
198. Id. at annex 1901.2(2)-(4). Alternatively, these numbers could be lowered to provide a total
of 3 panelists--each side choosing I panelist apiece and jointly selecting the third.
199. See id. at art. 1909.
200. See id. at annex 1901.2(2)-(12) (excluding provisions concerning protective orders, which are
necessary to shield the confidential business information of parties subject to antidumping and
countervailing duty suits, but would be wholly inappropriate for marking disputes). These procedural
sections include, for instance, a time period for choosing panelists, id. at annex 1901.2(2), (3), and a
panelist immunity clause, id. at annex 1901.2(12).
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globalization of the marketplace has been perceived by some as causing the
recent waves of lay-offs and plant-closings in the United States, as imports
are seen usurping the market share that American products once enjoyed.
American manufacturers seek to use this anti-import sentiment to sell their
products. Section 304, as intended by Congress, provides them with a
means to do so. However, the section 516 procedure, which the CAFC
implicitly mandated in Norcal/Crosetti, fails to allow domestic manufactur-
ers to take advantage of section 304.
This Note maintains that it is not the place of the courts to contradict
such clearly expressed legislative intent. Thus, Congress should act to
"overrule" the decision of the CAFC. By adapting NAFTA dispute
resolution procedures to address domestic industry marking protests against
goods from any country, Congress would allow both importers and
domestic industry to benefit from clear and workable procedures, while
preserving the goals of section 304.
Christine N. Schnarr
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